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THE SUBPRIME MORTGAGE CRISIS: WILL IT 
CHANGE FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN US
MARKETS?
Lindsay Joyner
In August 2007, as the first effects of what has become a mortgage 
market crisis were being felt throughout the United States, a New York Times
article, “Calls Grow for Foreigners to Have a Say on US Market Rules,” 
reported that foreign investors were beginning to feel that in regard to the US
export of financial products, “losses to investors in other countries suggest[ed] 
that American regulators [were] not properly monitoring the products or 
alerting investors to the risks.” 1 As American markets constantly change and 
evolve through the creation of original financial products, the demand from 
foreigners for American financial products has rapidly grown. Thus, foreign 
investment has become increasingly vital to maintaining and increasing the US
Gross Domestic Product (GDP), the “market value of goods and services 
produced by labor and property in the United States, regardless of 
nationality.”2
To an outsider looking onto the financial markets of the US, it seems 
that the goal of the US government and all organizations in charge of 
regulating the securities markets should be to keep and encourage foreign 
investors rather than to drive them into investing in the growing Asian or 
European markets. Yet with the recent losses from the subprime mortgage 
market starting to expand into other types of investment markets, including the 
bond market through Collateralized Debt Obligations (CDOs),3 it does not 
seem as if US markets are inspiring confidence in foreign investors. CDOs, 
most often owned by investment banks, hedge funds, insurance companies, 
and public pension plans, are bonds backed by subprime home loans, yet 
losses on subprime mortgages have caused interest payments to stop.4
                                                                
1 Heather Timmons and Katrin Bennhold, Calls Grow for Foreigners to 
Have a Say on US Market Rules, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 29, 2007, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/08/29/business/worldbusiness/29regulate.html. 
2 Bureau of Economic Analysis, Glossary, 
http://www.bea.gov/bea/glossary/glossary_g.htm  (last visited January 12, 2008). 
3 Vikas Bajaj, Mortgage Security Bondholders Facing a Cutoff of Interest 
Payments, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 22, 2007, available at http://www.nytimes.com
/2007/10/22/business/22market.html. 
4 Id.
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Under conditions such as these, should the US find a way for 
international investors to monitor the risks of their investments other than 
American rating systems? Additionally, how could the US create the rights to 
monitor in foreign investors using the current tools of international law? 
Lastly, if a foreign State were to generate a law governing US markets, would 
that State be able to enforce its law in the US?
To address questions such as these, this paper looks at the current 
state of investment including in it a discussion of the current credit rating 
systems, the international market for US securities, and the recent subprime 
mortgage market problem. After laying the foundation of the current system, 
the note discusses the possibility of creating rights and how those rights could 
be created in foreign investors to have a greater role in or a better 
understanding of rating securities.
Additionally, this paper looks to enforcement issues that may arise 
should a foreign State try to create regulations concerning US markets.
Finally, the note weighs the costs and benefits of a universal rating system for 
securities including those listed on the US financial markets. As the many 
technological advances of the end of the 20th century and the beginning of the 
21st century have caused and/or increased globalization, an international 
system for rating securities may be the most helpful and plausible answer to 
maintaining foreign investment in the US.
I. BACKGROUND ON THE CURRENT STATE OF INVESTMENT
A. Current Security Rating Systems
With the recent losses experienced by foreign investors, faith in the 
ratings of securities has rapidly declined. Investors seem to be blaming their 
decisions on how the securities were rated and the securities’ inability to 
perform in a manner that would merit their rating. Although “globalization of 
financial markets” has led to an increasing number of credit rating agencies 
throughout the world, “the reliance on credit ratings was confined” to the US
for most of the 20th century.5 Credit Agencies have as their objective 
“provid[ing] [their] opinion on the creditworthiness of an entity and the 
financial obligations (such as, bonds, preferred stock, and commercial paper) 
issued by an entity.”6 Thus, after research into the security being offered, the 
                                                                
5 SEC, REPORT ON THE ROLE AND FUNCTION OF CREDIT RATING AGENCIES IN THE 
OPERATION OF THE SECURITIES MARKETS, AS REQUIRED BY SECTION 702(B) OF THE 
SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002 5 (2003), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/credratingreport0103.pdf. 
6 SEC Fast Answers, Credit Rating Agencies-NRSROs, 
http://www.sec.gov/answers/nrsro.htm (last visited Feb. 3, 2008). 
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credit agency must decide whether it is “investment grade,” and upon that 
decision, the rating given to the security expresses the level of risk to the 
investor.7
Although different rating agencies have different rating systems, 
generally, in order to denote how risky a security is, each security is given a 
letter rating.8 According to Standard & Poor’s Rating Services (S&P), credit 
ratings are based on the likelihood of payment, the nature and provision of 
obligations, and “[p]rotection afforded by, and relative position of, the 
obligation in the event of bankruptcy, reorganization, or other arrangement 
under the laws of bankruptcy and other laws affecting creditors' rights.”9 After 
taking the above elements into account, securities are given a series of letters 
corresponding to their level of risk. For example, under the S&P rating system, 
an “AAA” rating is the highest, meaning that the “obligor’s capacity to meet 
its financial commitment on the obligation is extremely strong.”10 In order of 
increasingly speculative characteristics (more risk), “AA,” “A,” “BBB,” “BB,” 
“B,” “CCC,” “CC,” “C,” and “D” ratings may also be given.11 However, a 
rating of “D” infers that the security is in payment default and is only used 
when payments have not been made “on the due date even if the applicable 
grace period has not expired;” additionally, “D” is used “upon the filing of a 
bankruptcy petition or the taking of a similar action if payments on an 
obligation are jeopardized.”12
Credit Rating Agencies have been around since the beginning of the 
20th century. Well-known agencies like Fitch, Inc. (Fitch), Moody’s 
Investment Service (Moody’s), and Standard & Poor’s Rating Services (S&P) 
have been doing business since 1913, 1909, and 1906, respectively.13
                                                                
7 Id.
8 Id.
9 Standard & Poor’s Rating Services, Definitions: Long-Term Issue Credit 
Ratings, 
http://www2.standardandpoors.com/portal/site/sp/en/us/page.article/2,1,1,4,120483406




13 Fitch Ratings, Inc., About Fitch Ratings, History of Fitch Ratings, 
http://www.fitchratings.com (last visited Feb. 3, 2008) (stating Fitch Ratings was 
“founded as the Fitch Publishing Company on Dec. 24, 1913” and published financial 
statistics for consumers including the New York Stock Exchange); Moodys.com, 
Moody’s History, 
http://www.moodys.com/moodys/cust/AboutMoodys/AboutMoodys.aspx?topic=histor
y (last visited  Feb. 3, 2008) (stating Moody’s went out of business during the stock 
market crash of 1907 but came back in 1909 with the idea to “publish a book that 
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Additionally, the aforementioned agencies are Nationally Recognized 
Statistical Rating Organizations (NRSROs), which are those credit agencies 
that have registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).14 In 
1975, Fitch, Moody’s, and S&P were the first ratings firms to be considered 
NRSROs by the SEC because they were nationally used.15 Currently, there are 
seven NRSROs including: A.M. Best Company, Inc.; DBRS Ltd.; Fitch; Japan 
Credit Rating Agency, Ltd.; Moody’s; Rating and Investment Information, 
Inc.; and S&P.16 NRSROs’ ratings “today are widely used as benchmarks in 
federal and state legislation, rules issued by financial and other regulators, 
foreign regulatory schemes, and private financial contracts.”17
The process of becoming a NRSRO has recently changed from 
designation to registration because of the passage of the Credit Rating Agency 
Reform Act of 2006.18 Under this Act, credit rating agencies must “disclose 
their procedures and methodologies for assigning ratings [and] . . . make 
public certain performance measurement statistics including historical 
downgrades and default rates.”19 Like the effect of registration requirements 
for securities that are to be listed on a stock exchange, the oversight created by 
the Act was to give investors a feeling of greater protection through increased 
“accountability, transparency, and competition in the credit rating industry.”20
Registration of NRSROs came about after the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 
2002 (Sarbanes-Oxley), Section 702, required the SEC to prepare a report on 
the “role and function of credit rating agencies in the operation of securities 
markets.”21 Sarbanes-Oxley required this report by the SEC in order to achieve 
one of its primary purposes: “to assure the integrity of the United States capital 
markets and restore investor confidence in the wake of financial scandals.”22
Although alternatives to NRSROs had been discussed before the financial 
                                                                                                                                           
analyzed the railroads and their outstanding securities,” and from there, Moody’s began 
expanding its base of analyzed companies); Standard & Poor’s, About S&P, Company 
History, http://www2.standardandpoors.com/portal/site/sp/en/us/page (last visited Feb. 
3, 2008) (stating that in 1906 the Standard Statistics Bureau was formed to provide 
financial information on US companies that had been unavailable).   
14 SEC Fast Answers, supra note 6.
15 SEC, supra note 5, at 8-9.
16 SEC Fast Answers, supra note 6.
17 SEC, supra  note 5, at 5.
18 Press Release, Sec. and Exch. Comm’n, Seven Credit Rating Agencies Register 
with SEC as Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations (Sept. 24, 2007), 
available at  http://www.sec.gov/ news/press/2007/2007-199.htm. 
19 Id.
20 Id.
21 SEC, supra note 5, at 3.
22 Id.
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scandals and the institution of Sarbanes-Oxley, nothing was done to achieve 
greater oversight of the credit rating agencies until after the subprime 
mortgage market had already started to fall apart.23   
Even though most of the credit rating agencies mentioned above have 
existed for bordering on a century and have an increasingly international 
reach,24 recent events, most notably the subprime mortgage market collapse, 
have still caused a decline in faith in these systems. Criticism of the agencies 
stems from actions by the credit rating agencies in the ratings given to these 
securities. According to, “Credit ratings fueled subprime boom,” an article in 
the Seattle Post-Intelligencer, “[a]bout 80% of the [subprime mortgage] 
securities carried AAA ratings, the same designation given to US Treasury 
bonds,” yet the subprime mortgage securities offered “higher returns than the 
government bonds with the same ratings.”25 Thus, investors began purchasing 
subprime securities over US Treasury bonds because they were rated so as to 
infer they were safe while offering greater return potential. However, in the 
aftermath of the failure of the subprime mortgage market, the trust in credit 
rating agencies has transformed into a “feeling of betrayal.”26
B. Current Foreign Investment in US Markets
Unlike the isolationist nation created in the halls of Philadelphia in 
1787, dividing the fledgling nation from the rest of the world with the newly 
created Constitution, the United States no longer tries to maintain trade only 
within its borders. Globalization has become commonplace as “[f]iber optics 
                                                                
23See id. at 10 (discussing the three alternatives to NRSROs: “(a) eliminating 
reliance on NRSRO for purposes of Commission rules, (b) retaining the use of NRSRO 
ratings in Commission rules and the current method for designating rating agencies as 
NRSROs, and (c) implementing more direct and expanded oversight of credit rating 
agencies”). 
24 Fitch, supra note 13 (stating it has 49 worldwide offices today); Moodys.com, 
About Moody’s, 
http://www.moodys.com/moodys/cust/AboutMoodys/AboutMoodys.aspx?topic=intro&
redir_url=/cust/AboutMoodys/staticRedirect.asp (last visited Feb. 2, 2008) (tracking 
debt in more than “100 sovereign nations”); Standard & Poor’s, About S&P, Overview, 
http://www2.standardandpoors.com/portal/site/sp/en/us/page (last visited Feb. 3, 2008) 
(reporting credit ratings of outstanding debt at a sum of “$34 Trillion in 100 
countries”). 
25 Kathleen M. Howley, Credit ratings fueled subprime boom, SEATTLE POST-
INTELLIGENCER, Dec. 27, 2007, available at
http://seattlepi.nwsource.com/business/344991_subprime27.html.  
26 Id. (quoting Sylvain Raynes, “a former Moody’s analyst who now is a principal 
at R&R Consulting”).
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and the satellite now allow money to move quickly throughout the world.”27
Today, computers and even smart phones provide instant gratification to 
investors looking for current prices and other information on worldwide 
securities. Making the world flatter has reduced information asymmetry so that 
“raising capital and investing can happen anywhere and . . . everywhere.”28
The US Census Bureau’s 2008 Statistical Abstract (Abstract) 
publishes the current estimates of foreign investment in the US29 The Abstract 
presented the international investment position by using a table that shows, 
among other things, foreign investment in the U.S from the year 2000-2006.30
Factors considered in determining the numbers provided in the Abstract 
include “[t]he movement of foreign and US capital[,] . . . changes in prices of 
securities, defaults, expropriations, and write-offs.”31 According to the 
Abstract’s estimates for the end of the year, foreign-owned US securities other 
than US Treasury securities grew from $2,623 billion in 2000 to $5,229 billion 
in 2006.32 However, foreign investment coming into US markets was not the 
only interesting estimate offered. For the same time period, 2000-2006, US
private assets in foreign securities grew from $2,426 billion to $5,432 billion, 
respectively.33 Although the numbers are not identical, they are comparable.
Thus, US investment in foreign securities differed from foreign investment in 
US securities mainly in that foreign investment seemed to steadily increase for 
the time period offered while US investment decreased in 2001 and 2002.34
Yet the dip likely may have occurred because of the events of September 11, 
2001 and their aftermath on the US economy and investing potential.
Although raw dollar amount data for foreign investment in US
markets is an essential statistic in studying foreign investment, the percentage 
growth of that foreign investment in comparison to the total volume growth in 
US markets also merits mention. When comparing foreign investment growth 
to the volume of trading increase on an exchange market, such as the New 
York Stock Exchange (NYSE), foreign trading grew quicker than the 
                                                                
27 JAMES D. COX, ROBERT W. HILLMAN, & DONALD C. LANGEVOORT, SECURITIES 
REGULATION: CASES & MATERIALS 99 (5th ed. 2006).
28 Id.
29 See US CENSUS BUREAU, THE 2008 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT: 2008 EDITION 783
(2007), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2007pubs/08abstract/foreign.pdf. 
30 Id.
31 Id.
32 Id. at 789, Table 1261 (citing US Bureau of Economic Analysis, Survey of 
Current Business, July 2007).
33 Id.
34 Id.
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exchange from the years of 1984-1994 as it rose “at a compound rate of 18.5 
percent, whereas annual volume on that exchange [grew] at 12.34 percent.”35
Since the amount of foreign investment has become so large, the 
question on the minds of many regulators in the US is how to maintain 
security while maintaining the growth of US markets through foreign 
investment. To solve those worries, The Committee on Foreign Investment in 
the United States (CFIUS) has been charged with “overseeing the national 
security implications of foreign investment in the economy.”36
Although CFIUS was created by an executive order of President 
Ford, the 109th Congress wanted to amend its role after concern grew over the 
purchase of six American ports by Dubai Ports World (DP World).37 About a 
decade and a half before the renewed interest in CFIUS by the 109th Congress, 
President Ronald Reagan signed the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act 
of 1988 which included Section 5021, better known as the Exon-Florio 
Provision.38 At the time the Exon-Florio Provision was passed, Congress was 
worried that “foreign takeovers of US firms could not be stopped unless the 
President declared a national emergency or regulators invoked federal 
antitrust, environmental, or securities laws.”39 However, Congress did not 
intend for the provision to change the generally open policy of foreign 
investment in US markets.40 President Reagan later, through Executive Order 
12661, broadened CFIUS’s authority by making it an advisory committee that 
advised the President directly.41 Additionally, President Reagan gave CFIUS 
the ability to make recommendations concerning foreign investment.42
Currently, the twelve members of this interagency committee consist of 
Secretaries of [1] State, [2] the Treasury, [3] Defense, [4] 
Homeland Security, and [5] Commerce; [6] the United States Trade 
Representative, [7] the Chairman of the Council of Economic 
Advisers; [8] the Attorney General; [9] the Director of the Office of 
Management and Budget; [10] the Director of the Office of Science 
and Technology Policy; [11] the Assistant to the President for 
                                                                
35 COX, supra note 27, at 100 (citing NYSE Fact Book 1994). 
36 JAMES K. JACKSON, THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED 
STATES, CRS No. RL33388, at 1 (2007), available at http://www.fas.org
/sgp/crs/natsec/RL33388.pdf.
37 Id. at 1-2 (stating that the events of Sept. 11, 2001 changed the “nation’s 
economic and security concerns,” and these changes “require a reassessment of the role 
of foreign investment in the economy and in the nation’s security”).
38 Id. at 5.
39 Id.
40 Id. at 6.
41 Id.
42 Id.
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National Security Affairs; and [12] the Assistant to the President 
for Economic Policy.43
Even with all of those high-powered people in attendance on the 
committee, in the wake of the DP World attempted acquisitions of ports and 
other transactions, Congress has increased its oversight of CFIUS and has 
expressed its discontent with the committee.44 However, most economists do 
not believe in placing restrictions on the “inflow of foreign investment.”45
Economists have conceded though that there are costs and benefits to foreign 
investment that should be taken into account.46 The benefits include: added 
capital and potential for “productivity growth and innovation.”47 Yet foreign 
investment also conveys “dollar-denominated assets to foreign investors,” who 
have a choice of how to reinvest that money, and “repatriated capital and 
profits” are removed from the US economy reducing the entire amount of 
capital in the US economy.48 Thus, foreign investment represents both benefits 
and costs that have to be balanced before any regulation is passed.
Globalization has also initiated an “increasing interconnectedness of 
capital markets.”49 An event demonstrating interconnectedness that is 
somewhat reminiscent of the current subprime mortgage market crisis 
transpired on October 19, 1987.50 This event, known as “Black Monday,” 
occurred when the Dow Jones Industrial Average (the Dow) “plunged 508 
points or 22.6 percent.”51 This event set into motion a domino effect on the 
Tokyo and London markets causing them to post one-day declines of 14.7 
percent and 12.2 percent, respectively.52 Thus, although foreign investment in 
U.S securities is in the thousands of billions of dollars, the interdependence of 
the major world markets created by globalization may require more than just 
US securities regulations to maintain a healthy market. 
C. The Subprime Mortgage Collapse
Subprime mortgage securities seemed like the proverbial light at the 
end of a tunnel or the return of the withered “American Dream” for America’s 
middle class, a group who was feeling that it had less purchasing power due to 
                                                                
43 Id.
44 Id. at 23.




49 COX, supra note 27, at 101.
50 Id.
51 Id.
52 Id.  
2008]                                                 SUBPRIME MORTGAGE CRISIS                                       69
an increasing gap of wealth between America’s most affluent and it.
Unfortunately, the subprime mortgages’ stint as savior was short-lived 
because, in effect, they were a band-aid trying to patch up a gaping wound.
Subprime lending, known most simply as high-cost lending, 
“emerged in the early 1980s” after the adoption of the Depository Institutions 
Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980 (DIDMCA), Alternative 
Mortgage Parity Transaction Act of 1982 (AMPTA), and the Tax Reform Act 
of 1986 (TRA), yet subprime lending only grew rapidly after 1995.53 From 
1995-1998, the number of subprime fixed-rate mortgages (FRMs) and 
subprime adjustable-rate mortgages (ARMs) originated was increasing at a 
fairly quick rate; however, the subprime mortgage market took a slight 
downturn from 1998-2000 when “the total number of FRM originations 
declined.”54 Yet, after 2000, the subprime mortgage originations resumed their 
growth.55 “LoanPerformance” reported a 62% increase in the number of their 
subprime mortgage originations for the year 2002-2003, and “Inside Mortgage 
Finance” posted a 56% increase in the same area.56
Subprime mortgages differ from prime mortgages in one very 
important respect: “the upfront and continuing costs are higher for subprime 
loans.”57 Upfront costs arise when originating the loan, so they tend to include 
things like application and appraisal fees.58 Although it would seem that 
upfront fees would be the same for both prime and subprime mortgages, it has 
been reported that they differed because factors such as the borrowers’ credit 
history and “prepayment risk” have an effect on loan pricing.59 Continuing 
costs, as the name implies, cover costs that go into keeping a mortgage alive; 
therefore, they consist of “[1] mortgage insurance payments, [2] principle and 
interest payments, [3] late fees and delinquent payments, and [4] payments 
from locality (such as property taxes and special assessments).”60 Even though 
subprime mortgages had higher upfront and continuing costs, they 
“expand[ed] the pool of credit to borrowers who, for a variety of reasons, 
                                                                
53 Souphala Chomsisengphet & Anthony Pennington-Cross, The Evolution of the 
Subprime Mortgage Market, 88(1) FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS REVIEW
January/February 2006, at 31, 41, available at
http://research.stlouisfed.org/publications/review/06/01/ChomPennCross.pdf 
(discussing “basic information about subprime lending and how it has evolved, to aid 
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would be denied credit.”61 As the subprime mortgage originations allowed 
more people to purchase houses, the increase in number of borrowers who 
could receive credit made subprime mortgages the champion of the return of 
the “American Dream.” Since one of the primary ways a household can build 
wealth is homeownership, it has become a key economic factor; therefore, 
increased homeownership and increased opportunity for households to build 
wealth were benefits of subprime lending.62 Yet those benefits were never 
realized because missed payments and foreclosures became the only 
consequences of subprime mortgages.
The beginning of the end for subprime mortgages occurred in 2006.
After the peak of the housing market in 2005, the following year marked the 
beginnings of a slow down as new home sales were down 17.3% from 2005.63
Additionally, 2006 saw a drop in existing home sales: 8.4%.64 The housing 
market, or what has now been considered the housing bubble, started 
ballooning greatly when the Federal Reserve Board (the Fed) slashed short-
term interest rates from 2000 to 2004.65 However, as the housing market grew, 
the lending standards used became more cavalier as new mortgage products 
like “‘stated income’ loans, . . . ; ‘piggyback’ loans, . . .; and ‘option ARMS’ 
were permitted to enter the market.”66 When new standards were actually 
agreed upon, they covered some of the newest financial loan creations, but the 
Fed did not include subprime mortgages in those standards.67 Standards for 
subprime mortgages were actually not created until July 29, 2007, and by that 
point, the damage had already been done as “30 subprime lenders had gone out 
of business and many more were headed that way.”68
In the midst of the collapse of the subprime mortgage market, experts 
have pointed their fingers in several different directions as to how the market 
could have collapsed, almost completely, in such as short period of time.
Many have questioned how or why US governmental agencies, or any 
regulatory body, did not get involved sooner.69 As early as 2001, “Treasury 
                                                                
61 Id. at 31.
62 Id.
63 Dean Baker, 2007 Housing Bubble Update:10 Economic Indicators to Watch, 
CENTER FOR ECONOMIC AND POLICY RESEARCH Feb. 2007 at 1-2, available at 
http://www.cepr.net/documents/publications/housing_indicators_2007_02.pdf. 
64 Id. at 4.
65 Edmund L. Andrews, Fed Shrugged as Subprime Crisis Spread, N.Y. TIMES
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official, Sheila C. Bair, tried to persuade subprime lenders to adopt a code of 
‘best practices’ and to let outside monitors verify their compliance.”70 But, her 
idea was not well-received by the lenders, and the status quo was maintained 
until it was too late.71 The Fed has been one of the main targets of blame as 
decisions by the Federal Reserve and other regulatory agencies have shown 
that they “waited until it was too late to try to tame the industry’s excesses.”72
Additionally, the Fed repeatedly held that there was not a housing 
bubble even going so far as to say that declines felt in the real estate market 
would be local but “almost certainly not nationwide.” 73 Unfortunately, as it 
turned out, that position was incorrect.74 However, the Fed was not the only 
agency that did not proceed with caution in the subprime mortgage market as 
“virtually every federal bank regulator was loathe to impose speed limits on a 
booming industry.”75 Additionally, the limits were difficult to create and 
enforce because the regulators were “an alphabet soup of agencies with 
splintered and confusing jurisdictions;” consequently, not all mortgage lenders 
fell into any of the agencies’ jurisdictions.76
Although traditionally mortgages were thought of as a loan between 
one lender and one borrower, the subprime mortgage market crisis has shown 
otherwise as the effects of its collapse on the US economy and potentially the 
global economy have yet to be determined; instead, the trend seems to be that 
they are growing each day. With subprime mortgages, the lenders were 
“financed by investors on Wall Street who b[ought] packages of loans called 
mortgage-backed securities”77 Mortgage-backed securities have “significantly 
altered the role of institutions in residential real estate financing and expanded 
the availability of financing for real estate purchases.”78 These securities 
allowed institutions like banks to avoid becoming the “long-term lender” for 
the real estate purchaser; instead, they could dispose of the risk by 
“develop[ing] a pool of mortgages, transfer[ing] th[ose] mortgages to a trust, 
and caus[ing] the trust to sell undivided interests in itself to large numbers of 
investors.”79









78 COX, supra note 27, at 92.
79 Id.
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Some, or in reality probably many, of these investors were foreign 
and had never seen the houses being purchased let alone met the purchasers 
that they were helping by investing in securities backed by subprime 
mortgages. Thus, these investors “were pouring trillions of dollars into 
American securities. Much of that money, often described as the ‘global 
savings glut,’ flowed directly into mortgage-backed securities that were used 
to finance subprime mortgages.”80
II. ANALYSIS
A. Creating Rights in Foreign Investors through Sources of Transnational 
Law
As there is currently no specific way for foreign investors to regulate 
or even to have greater say in the rating and regulation of securities in US
markets, a right would have to be created through some source of transnational 
law if foreign investors are ever going to see their desires come to fruition.
Transnational law contemplates “all law which regulates actions or events that 
transcend national frontiers. Both public [international law] and private 
international law are included, as are other rules which do not wholly fit into 
such standard categories.”81 Although some sources of transnational law are 
considered to be more significant than others, current sources include treaties, 
customary international law, general principles of law, teachings of scholars, 
regulatory regimes, non-binding “soft law,” and international private law.
However, this paper is limited in that it will look only to the possibility and 
practicality of using treaties, customary international law, and regulatory 
regimes to create an international system for rating securities.  
1. Treaties
Although there is no treaty directly discussing the regulation rights of 
foreign investors over US securities, it may be possible to use established 
treaties, including those that created important international organizations such 
as the United Nations (UN), the World Trade Organization (WTO), and 
Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OCED), as a guide 
to whether the rights that foreign investors are searching for can be created and 
sustained.
Originally, States were the only actors who could generate and 
enforce treaties. To this end, the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
(VCLT), as a “treaty on treaties,” was created to define and describe treaty law 
                                                                
80 Andrews, supra note 65.
81 PHILIP JESSUP, TRANSNATIONAL LAW 2 (Yale Univ. Press 1956).
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rules.82 In Article 2 of the VCLT, a “treaty” is defined under the Convention as 
“an international agreement concluded between States in written form and 
governed by international law.”83 Therefore, if a treaty is between non-State 
actors, it is not governed by the VCLT; however, the existence of the VCLT 
does not mean that an agreement will not be binding as between non-State 
actors.84 Instead, the VCLT offers guidelines that must be accomplished when 
States enter into treaties. Thus, if the US and the United Kingdom, or any 
other combination of the US and a foreign State, decided to create investor 
rights in regulating US securities’ ratings, that treaty would fall under the 
jurisdiction of the VCLT. Bilateral treaties such as that suggested above would 
not likely work in practicality because the origin of foreign investors are so 
varied.
However, if the US only wanted British investors to have special 
rights, those rights could be created through a bilateral treaty or a multilateral 
treaty depending on how many countries with whom the US wanted to 
contract.85 To meet all of the requirements of the VCLT, a treaty would have 
to be “in written form and governed by international law” as well as adopted 
and ratified pursuant to “Part II” of the VCLT.86 The extent of any treaty 
created between the US and any number of other States would be “controlled 
by the intent of the parties.”87
A comparable treaty to what would have to be created to give the 
investors of a country the rights to regulate US securities is the Bilateral 
Investment Treaty (BIT) between the US and Argentina.88 In the BIT between 
the US and Argentina, Article I provides that “investment” means “every kind 
of investment in the territory of one Party owned or controlled directly by 
nationals or companies of the other Party, . . . [including] tangible and
intangible property, . . ., such as mortgages, liens and pledges.”89 From that 
early definition of investment, the treaty goes on to cover investors’ rights in 
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an “investment dispute.”90 Seeing as a bilateral agreement already exists that 
defines investors’ rights, although not the same rights as would be necessary to 
aid foreign investors in gaining power of regulating rating of US securities, 
investors’ rights are possible. However, the US would have to desire to make 
the treaty, as it did with Argentina, before any rights in foreign investors could 
ever be assigned.
International organizations such as the UN may offer hope for 
internationalization of regulation of securities. As stated in the Preamble to the 
UN Charter (the Charter), one of the goals of the UN is “to employ 
international machinery for the promotion of the economic and social 
advancement of all peoples.”91 Therefore, if the internationalization of 
securities regulation and rating is considered as a benefit to the world’s 
economic advancement, the UN would have an argument to take jurisdiction 
from domestic sources. However, it would be a difficult idea to sell to the US
based solely on the Preamble because it means that the US would have to give 
up some sovereignty. In addition to the Preamble, the UN Charter provided for 
an “Economic and Social Council” as an organ of the organization.92 The 
Charter further suggests that the UN shall promote “solutions of international 
economic, . . . problems.”93 Additionally, in outlining the functions and powers 
of t the Economic and Social Council of the UN, the Charter maintains that the 
“fifty-four members of the UN elected by the General Assembly” comprising 
the council are entitled to 
[1] make or initiate studies and reports with respect to 
international economic, . . . matters and. . . make 
recommendations with respect to any such matters to the 
General Assembly, to the Members of the United Nations, 
and to the specialized agencies concerned. . . . [3] [P]repare 
draft conventions for submission to the General Assembly. . 
. . [4] [M]ay call . . . international conferences on matters 
falling within its competence. 94
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Therefore, in arguing for UN jurisdiction over the rating of securities, 
an example of “international machinery,” as mentioned in the Preamble, could 
be an international securities regulation system that uses universal criteria for 
determining the risk ratings of securities, including American securities. Some 
may argue that the resulting financial state of the world markets, in the 
aftermath of the subprime mortgage breakdown, is not a large enough 
economic problem to push the UN to create standards and regulations.
However, the repercussions of the failure of the subprime mortgage market 
seem to be just beginning and could potentially evolve into an economic 
problem that would have grave effects on investor confidence across the globe.
Currently, no matter the size or the reputation of the news source, all 
newspapers and other news sources report daily on the subprime mortgage 
market and its fallout, indicating that there is brewing international economic 
trouble. From the crash of the subprime market in the summer of 2007 through 
today, consequences of the subprime mortgage market crisis have led investors 
to “liquidate[] holdings in a sign of spreading credit turmoil” out of fear that 
“economic weakness would affect corporate profits, leveraged buy-outs and 
commercial property. ”95
Under the realm of the functions and powers of the Economic and 
Social Council is a related specialized agency whose work with this council 
may be directed toward internationalization of securities regulation: the World 
Trade Organization (WTO). The WTO began in 1995 as a successor to the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).96 Its functions include 
“[a]dministering trade agreements” that result from “negotiation between the 
members” in an effort to keep trade as fair as possible.97 Although under 
GATT, the emphasis of regulation had been on products and commodities, the 
scope of the WTO was broadened to include the service industry by the 
General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS).98
Since the WTO no longer only applies to the trade of goods, the 
WTO could be used as a way to universalize securities regulations and ratings.
Thus, it would seem possible for capital markets to enjoy the same principles 
of “freer and fairer trade” since banks and insurance firms enjoy them.99 As 
the US is considered by many to be “exporting financial products,” it would 
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seem that the trade developed by this export system could come under the 
jurisdiction of the WTO.100 Additionally, the WTO is charged with dispute 
settlement for “resolving trade quarrels.”101 However, the WTO does not 
“purport to regulate” certain areas.102 Consequently, as securities are not listed 
as an exception to the WTO’s scope, if the WTO were to take on jurisdiction 
by qualifying the subprime mortgage market crisis as a trade quarrel, a country 
could bring a dispute to the WTO concerning foreign investors’ lack of rights 
over regulation of the rating system for securities in the US The WTO would 
be able to consult on the quarrel and to rule on it through a panel of experts.103
Although not a treaty creating an international regulatory body for 
securities, the “Convention on the Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development” (OECD) could possibly be interpreted to cover this desire 
by foreign investors or could be considered comparable to what would have to 
be specifically created to provide for regulation over US securities’ ratings 
from some body other than the SEC approved NRSROs. The OECD offers a 
“unique forum where the government of 30 market democracies work together 
to . . . provide[] a setting where governments can compare policy experiences, 
seek answers to common problems, identify good practice and co-ordinate 
domestic and international policies.”104
Although it began in 1961 in Paris by analyzing policy areas within 
each member country, globalization has changed the focus of OECD; 
consequently, the OECD looks at “how various policy areas interact with each 
other, between countries and beyond the OECD area.”105 Currently, the 
structure of OECD is made up of the Secretariat, the Council, and the 
Committees.106 Upon request of any of the OECD’s 30 members, staff 
members of the secretariat do research and analysis that is later used by 
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representatives of the members in one of approximately 200 committees.107
The committees offer an exchange of ideas for members on certain issues, and 
even after committee meetings, the representatives, usually “senior officials 
from national administrations,” have access to OECD documents over the 
internet and are able to “exchange information through a special network.”108
However, the OECD Council, comprised of one representative from 
each member country and a “representative of the European Commission,” 
holds all of the legal, decision-making power.109 Upon a consensus of votes in 
its annual ministerial meeting, the Council mandates work for the secretariat to 
accomplish.110 The staff of the secretariat, including some “700 economists, 
lawyers, scientists and other professionals,” is based in 12 directorates who 
service one or more committees because the work of OECD is increasingly 
“cross-disciplinary.”111
If the OECD was to be used to create regulation rights of US
securities in foreign investors, the relevant directorates to do the work would 
be The Economics Department and The Directorate for Financial and 
Enterprise Affairs (DFEA). The Economics Department “provides an overall 
framework to identify structural priorities needing government attention . . . 
includ[ing] work on the economic implications of . . . financial market 
developments, barriers to international trade in services and foreign direct 
investment.”112 Like the Economics Department, the DFEA tackles “public 
policy challenges of direct concern to business to enhance economic growth 
and development, ensure financial stability and promote the effective 
integration of non-OECD countries in the global economy.”113 In order to 
accomplish this task, the DFEA examines trends and makes recommendations 
on whether and/or how to make national regulations or international 
cooperation.114
Losses to foreign investors from around the globe, not just from the 
member countries of the OECD, occurred in part because the NRSROs 
wrongly assured investors that bundled subprime mortgages were not riskier 
than bundled regular mortgages when sold as asset-backed securities. Under 
this argument, the problem with giving these two financial instruments the 
same rating, when the two do not in actuality have identical risk factors, seems 
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to qualify under the areas of financial market development and foreign direct 
investment in the Economics Department and financial stability and global 
economy for non-OECD countries of the DFEA. Thus, to internationalize
ratings on securities, foreign investors could try to appeal to their 
representatives to the OECD. The investors would have to convince a member 
country to request research and analysis on this topic by either directorate or 
both through the secretariat to be used in committee, or the member country’s 
investors could push for the member to bring the issue before the Council at its 
annual ministerial meeting. From there, foreign investors would only be able 
to hope that the Council “unanimous[ly] consent[ed]” since a “veto from a 
Council member removes an item from the agenda.”115 If the issue passed the 
Council vote, a ruling on the topic could be binding. Under the Convention for 
OECD, the Organization may make its decisions binding on all members and 
may “enter into agreements with [m]embers, non-member States and 
international organizations.”116
In order for a decision like this to take effect though, the US would 
have to agree before it would be binding on the US because “[n]o decision 
shall be binding on any Member until it has complied with the requirements of 
its own constitutional procedures.”117 Therefore, to use the OECD, the US
would have to give up willingly some of its sovereignty because it would no 
longer be in complete control of the rating systems for its securities. However, 
the OECD has had some success in areas somewhat comparable to the ratings 
systems in that it was an essential part of the creation of and encouragement to 
use “corporate codes of conduct that attempt to develop a set of standards for 
multinational firms that can be applied across national borders.”118 Yet even 
with the aforementioned example of work of the OECD, there are still those 
that criticize its role.119 One argument against the OECD expressed the view 
that OECD “represents a danger to national sovereignty.”120 Consequently, 
since an international system of rating securities would take away some 
sovereignty in nations, especially the US, the US may not want to allow the 
OECD to take on the role of creating such a system. 
If the UN, the WTO, and the OECD refused to take up the issue of 
lack of confidence in the securities rating system in the US due to the collapse 
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of the subprime mortgage market or saw the issue as outside of each of their 
scopes, a separate international organization could be created. However, a 
project of that magnitude would not be taken on lightly as these organizations 
have taken decades to achieve the power and respect they have today. Since 
the problems created by the subprime mortgage market are still new, although 
they seem to be increasingly daily, a long, drawn-out treaty writing and 
ratification process seems unlikely. It is more likely that proponents of change 
would try to go through the existing channels by finding a way that this 
problem could fit within their given power rather than charting a new path. 
2. Customary International Law
A second well-respected source of international law that could 
possibly be used to create rights in foreign investors is customary international 
law (“CIL”). As there is no “inherent hierarchy” between CIL and treaties in 
terms of the value of the source, a rule may “develop through a parallel 
evolution in both treaties and customs.”121 According to the Restatement 
(Third) of Foreign Relations, Section 102, customary international law “results 
from a general and consistent practice of states followed by them from a sense 
of legal obligation.”122
Thus, there is both an objective prong and a subjective prong in 
deciding whether a practice is CIL. The objective prong is the State practice 
part of the Restatement’s definition, and the subjective prong then concerns 
the sense of legal obligation felt by the State.123 CIL allows actors in the 
international legal field to “informally develop rules of behavior, without the 
necessity of resorting to more formal and difficult means of law-making.”124
The actors that CIL traces include: “States, international institutions, 
transnational business organizations, religious and civil groups, and 
individuals involved in international matters.”125 Thus, the foreign investors 
qualify as competent actors to create CIL because they could be classified as 
transnational business organizations or just individuals where the international 
matter in which they were involved would be foreign investment.
A classic way in which to understand how international custom 
becomes international law comes from an American case that is over a century 
old: The Paquete Habana.126 This turn-of-the-twentieth century US Supreme 
Court case involved two fishing vessels that were taken as prizes of war by the 
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US during war with Spain.127 The vessels were later sold, but the case turns on 
whether it was against CIL for the fishing vessels to have been captured since 
there is a practice that “coast fishing vessels, pursuing their vocation of 
catching and bringing in fresh fish, have been recognized as exempt, with their 
cargoes and crews, from capture as prize of war.”128 After extensive writing on 
the history behind the practice, including treaties and King’s orders from as far 
back as the fifteenth century, the Court held that “[v]essels belonging to 
citizens of the enemy state, and devoted to fishing along the coasts cannot be 
subject to capture” as long as those vessels did not qualify under the two 
exceptions offered where the vessel has either been used for a “warlike 
purpose” or “devoted to the great fishery in the ocean.”129 Although the 
holding shows a preference for maintaining CIL in the US, this is a domestic 
court ruling on international law. It is not creating international law for any 
other State besides the US, and additionally, the rule it offers is a very narrow 
one.   
Therefore for foreign investors to use CIL to create rights in 
regulation over how US securities are rated so that they better understand the 
risk involved, the interested investors would have to show in a US court that 
the custom of international rating of securities has been widely practiced by 
States and that the practice has caused a sense of legal obligation to develop.
The investors would have to present evidence concerning the State practice 
including things like treaties that are on point. As previously discussed, there 
is no treaty stating that investors of foreign countries have any rights 
concerning rating the securities of US financial markets, so the evidence 
would seem to be difficult, if not impossible at the current time, to find.
CIL takes years to develop so that general acceptance of the practice 
and a sense of legal obligation has time to develop. For example the opinion of 
the aforementioned case, The Paquete Habana, delved into centuries of 
practice and legal obligation as evidence of CIL.130 There is no such evidence 
of CIL on this topic because the global economy is a developing concept.
Although eventually internationalized securities ratings may rise to the level of 
CIL because the concept may be narrow enough and the practice may develop, 
in part as a consequence of to the current crisis of US and foreign markets due 
to subprime mortgages, there does not exist now any customary international 
law on the topic. Even though CIL is a respected source of international law, it 
is unable at this time to be used by foreign investors to achieve their goals in 
US securities markets. However, if investors began to harness support to 
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create a general practice of making the ratings systems for securities 
international and the US disliked the practice, the US would have to actively 
try to avoid following the practice because CIL will become binding on actors 
that fail to object.131  
3. Regulatory Regimes
The final source of transnational law discussed in this paper is 
regulatory regimes which in comparison to treaties and customarily 
international law are considered to be relatively new. Currently there is no 
international regulatory regime governing the rating of securities, yet a 
regulatory regime that has shown promise in the area of banking may imply 
that an international regulatory regime would be a way for foreign investors 
finally to be a part of rating securities on US markets. Created by the Bank for 
International Settlements, an international organization in its own right, “in the 
aftermath of serious disturbances in international currency and banking 
markets,” this model regulatory regime is known today as the Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision (the Committee or the Basel Committee) 
and was founded as the Committee on Banking Regulations and Supervisory 
Practices.132
Originally, in 1974, the members of the Committee were the “central-
bank Governors of the Group of Ten countries.”133 Currently though members 
come from countries including: Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, 
Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United 
Kingdom, and United States.134 In 1988, the Committee responded to “the 
overriding need for a multinational accord to strengthen the stability of the 
international banking system and to remove a source of competitive inequality 
arising from differences in national capital requirements” by introducing “a 
capital measurement system” known today as the Basel Capital Accord.135 The 
Basel Accord “provided for the implementation of [a] framework with a 
minimum capital ratio of capital to risk-weighted assets of 8 percent by end-
1992.”136 In the twenty years since the implementation of the Basel Accord, 
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member countries and “virtually all other countries with active international 
banks” have implemented its regulations.137
Since the Committee “does not possess any formal supranational 
supervisory authority,” its regulations are considered to be non-binding, “soft 
law.”138 However, “soft law” has had a “tendency, over time, to harden into 
international legal obligation.”139 With the reliance by so many countries on 
the original regulations offered by the Committee and with the continued 
loyalty to the Committee by countries “working to adopt the Basel II text 
through domestic rule-making and approval processes,” it seems that the 
regulatory regime created by the Committee has become a well-respected 
source of international law.140 Thus, it would seem that a regulatory regime 
resembling that of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision may work for 
the regulation and rating of securities as “there has been no successful effort at 
international harmonization of the regulation of securities transactions.”141
To create a regulatory regime like that of the Basel Committee, 
foreign investors wishing to create the international system would need to 
enlist the help of the States in which they are domiciled. Once there was State 
support of the idea, the States would then have to come together to make 
decisions about the definition and scope of the regime. One of the first 
decisions to make would be what governmental body would act as the 
representative to the regime since on the Basel Committee the central bank of 
each member and the corresponding governmental authority of the banking 
business represent their respective member country.142 The next issue before 
the potential member countries would be to discuss the scope of the proposed 
regime. The Basel Committee has as its purpose to “encourage[] convergence 
towards common approaches and common standards without attempting 
detailed harmonisation of member countries’ supervisory techniques.”143 To 
achieve this goal, the Committee makes sure that its guidelines are broad 
enough such that “no foreign banking establishment should escape 
supervision; and that supervision should be adequate.”144 A regulatory regime 
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for the internationalization of rating regulation of securities could be 
established in much the same way. The representatives could be bodies whose 
current job it is to regulate the ratings of securities such as the SEC with its 
regulation over NRSROs in the US.
After choosing who the representatives would be, the fledgling 
regime would then be able to decide whether it wanted to be narrower in its 
regulation by creating one specific rating system or whether it wanted to 
follow the lead of the Basel Committee and decide on uniform standards for 
rating securities that could then be added to member countries’ current 
systems for rating. Part of the success of the Basel Committee seems to be 
because it has remained broad in its recommendations. By remaining broad in 
its scope, the Committee has been able to maintain “ongoing collaboration in 
the supervision of international banks” and has expanded its reach to related 
topics including: “the obstacles to effective supervision arising from bank 
secrecy regulations in different countries; . . . [and] overcoming the 
impediments experienced by banking supervisors in conducting effective 
consolidated supervision of the cross-border operations of international 
banks.”145 Thus, if a regime were to be created for rating of securities through 
international means, the regime should try to formulate standards, guidelines, 
and recommendations that would be able to be practically implemented by the 
members. By making the standards something that can be achieved through 
domestic regulation as well, the regime would not be infringing too drastically 
on the sovereignty of the members, and compliance would be a more realistic 
expectation. 
Lastly, after the potential members carved out who would represent 
the members in deliberations, what the regime’s goals would be, and how the 
regime planned to carry out those goals, those potential members would have 
to create, sign, and put into force some sort of charter “combining the elements 
of public constitutions and articles of incorporation.”146 The regulatory regime 
would derive its power from this charter, and the charter would ensure 
compliance much like the Constituent Charter of the Bank for International 
Settlements which created the Bank for International Settlements who in turn 
created the Basel Committee.147
However, the creation and use of a regulatory regime may not be as 
well-received as that of the Basel Committee as there are those that criticize 
centralized international regulatory regimes in favor of competition. One such 
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critic, Roberta Romano, of the Yale Law School and National Bureau of 
Economic Research, takes the position that securities regulations should not be 
internationalized.148 Instead, she argues that the “absence of a uniform 
international regulatory scheme is, . . ., a benefit for investors in securities 
because it allows for some competition among securities regimes.”149
One benefit under the regulatory competition regime espoused by 
Romano is a reduction in “the possibility that a regulator will be able to 
transfer wealth across different regulated entities or redistribute wealth from 
the regulated sector to preferred individuals or organizations.”150 This is a 
benefit because it allows institutional investors the opportunity to avoid “fixed 
commission rates” which aid individual investors and exchange members by 
permitting them to switch to a lower cost regulator.151 Another benefit to 
competition would be that it could correct for policy mistakes faster than a 
single regulator could because an issuer’s decision to go with one regime 
rather than another would signify preference.152 Under this idea, if an issuer 
did not like a specific policy made by one regulatory body, its choice of 
another, even though the products were the same, would show the first 
regulatory body that there may be a mistake in its policy which would in turn 
inspire change quicker than it would without the competition. A third possible 
benefit with greater competition among regulation of securities would be 
innovation.153 Under this benefit, no regime would be satisfied with 
maintaining status quo if that meant that consumers would head to another 
regime, and the constant evolution would increase the possibility of creating 
new “products, institutional practices, and legal rules.”154
Apart from the benefits of competition though is its ability to actually 
work in practice. Just as treaties or regulatory regimes would need government 
help to be created so too would a competitive regulatory market.155 Under a 
competitive regime, nations would have to give up, or at least change, their 
“present territorial jurisdictional approach” in favor of a “statutory securities 
domicile” which would be selected by the issuer.156 Giving up territorial 
jurisdiction seems to be a high bar to set in favor of the benefits offered. The 
bar seems to get even higher if mutual recognition to release territorial 
jurisdiction for statutory securities domicile can only be “effectuated by a 
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treaty or other executive agreement approved at a higher governmental level 
than the securities agency.”157 So it seems that even in competition, there is a 
need for sources of transnational law.
Thus, whether advocating for greater breadth of regulation to bring all 
rating standards for securities under one umbrella or for diversifying the way 
in which securities are regulated so as to achieve economic efficiency, a 
regulatory regime may be the most likely remedy for foreign investors looking 
to change the way that securities on US markets are currently regulated.    
B. Enforcement in the US Should a Foreign State Domestically Create 
Rights
Jurisdiction is essential to any case brought before a court or any 
regulatory body looking to pass a resolution or piece of legislation. It can 
mean the right to prescribe, the right to adjudicate, or the right to enforce.158 A 
nation’s jurisdiction to enforce correlates with its jurisdiction to prescribe rules 
“that impact the conduct and behavior of individuals outside the United 
States” and its jurisdiction to adjudicate “a matter involving a foreign national 
or events that transpired beyond that country’s borders.”159 If a foreign State 
were domestically to create a piece of legislation concerning the rights of its 
investors in reference to US securities or if an individual or State to bring a 
case against the US in the US for losses sustained due to the collapse of the 
subprime mortgage market, the right would not be respected until enforcement 
in the US had been demonstrated. Yet enforcement is not a concept that is 
unique to the United States. “[M]uch of international law depends for its 
success on enforcement through national legal systems.”160
1. Comity
The word “comity” has several meanings that are unique to the 
context in which it is used. Among those contexts is that of enforcement of 
foreign legislation or judgments when there are “conflicting claims of State 
jurisdiction and power.”161 Determining whether a court will enforce a 
judgment by using comity is the traditional approach. Thus, comity in this 
sense is best defined by a late 19th century US Supreme Court case, Hilton v. 
Guyot, as 
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neither a matter of absolute obligation, . . ., nor of mere 
courtesy and good will, . . . it is the recognition which one
nation allows within its territory to the legislative, executive, 
or judicial acts of another nation, having due regard both to 
international duty and convenience, and to the rights of its 
own citizens, or of other persons who are under the 
protection of its laws.162
In Hilton, the action arose because a French liquidator was trying to 
recover from a judgment which was awarded in a French court in Paris against 
citizens of the US who had been in business in Paris but had since left 
France.163 Although the French proceedings and judgment were not denied by 
the Americans in their answer to the complaint, they did assert that they “had 
no property within the jurisdiction of France out of which that judgment could 
be collected.”164 After a thorough discussion of comity and the practices of 
other jurisdictions for enforcing judgments, the Supreme Court held the 
judgment to be inconclusive because of the rule of reciprocity, the rule that a 
judgment “in a foreign country is allowed the same effect only as the courts of
that country allow to the judgments of the country in which the judgment in 
question is sought to be executed.”165 Although the rule of reciprocity is not 
widely used presently, at the time, the Supreme Court did not believe France 
would have honored a US judgment, so it did not enforce the French 
judgment. If the US only used this rule for interpreting cases, it would only 
enforce judgments from jurisdictions that enforce US judgments meaning that 
comity, or deference, would only be shown to certain jurisdictions.
To illustrate Hilton’s holding, imagine a foreign investor domiciled in 
Britain lost a large sum of money after relying on his or her investment firm’s, 
a New York based firm with no assets abroad, advice to purchase subprime 
mortgage-backed securities in the US during the housing boom of 2005. If that 
same investor then brought an action under British law and in Britain against 
the investment firm and a British court proceeded to award judgment to the 
British investor, would that judgment be enforced in the US when the investor 
tried to collect on it? If the holding of Hilton is taken into account, the main 
question for the court listening to the case in the US is whether the U.K. shows 
the same deference to American judgments that are looking to be enforced 
abroad. Thus, since comity between the US and UK is generally accepted, the 
British investor could prevail. However, comity, and specifically the rule of 
reciprocity, is not the only thing used to decide in a case such as that presented 
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in the above example. Whether a case, such as the one hypothesized, would be 
enforced in a US court would depend on factors used in addition to comity.
In actuality, comity does not experience unanimous praise anymore, 
so it may aid a foreign investor trying to collect on a foreign judgment in the 
United States.166 One case from the early 1990’s, Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. 
California, represents the chagrin for the use of comity when a foreign 
government may allow behavior that the US does not.167 In this antitrust suit in 
which the use of the Sherman Antitrust Act on foreign reinsurers is a part of 
the argument, nineteen states as well as private parties sued domestic insurers, 
domestic and foreign reinsurers, and insurance brokers because of their alleged 
engagement in “various conspiracies to affect the American insurance 
market.”168 In the portion of the opinion dealing with comity, the Supreme 
Court held in a 5-4 vote that “international comity does not preclude District 
Court jurisdiction over the foreign conduct alleged .”169 By holding such, the 
Court was allowing a US court to exert jurisdiction over a foreign company.
To the majority, the “substantial question . . .[was] whether ‘there [wa]s in fact 
a true conflict between domestic and foreign law.’”170 Although the London 
reinsurers tried to argue that the application of the Sherman Act by the Court 
would “conflict significantly with British law,” the majority was not 
persuaded.171 The Court did not find conflict because the London reinsurers 
could have complied with both British and American law.172 Under this 
rationale, comity is not immediately presumed. Instead, a foreign party (such 
as an investor) looking to enforce a foreign judgment in the US under comity 
principles would have to show that the foreign law required the US party (such 
as an investment firm) “to act in some fashion prohibited by the law of the 
Unites States.”173 Consequently, with the ever-evolving global economy, laws 
do not seem to conflict as often as would be necessary for a comity argument 
to work.
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2. Enforcement of Foreign Judgments
Although there have been no cases as of yet from other countries or 
their nationals concerning the collapse of the subprime mortgage market in the 
United States, the consequences of the collapse have not yet been fully 
realized. Since confidence seems to drive the securities markets, investors, 
both foreign and American, must regain that feeling about the way in which 
the securities that are being sold to them are rated. Until that confidence is 
regained, there is a chance that US courts will see complaints filed by foreign 
investors looking to either recover directly through the US court system or 
looking to have a foreign judgment enforced. As investors are probably more 
likely to bring cases in their home States for reasons such as cost or 
convenience, foreign judgment enforcement may be a way for the investors to 
assert the rights they do have to make a change in the US securities markets.
Additionally, by asserting their right to litigate, foreign investors may also 
inspire change more quickly than through an international organization or the 
creation of a treaty.
An important part of the formerly discussed Hilton case came in the 
dicta of the case which created a nine-element test for enforcement of foreign 
judgments that is still used currently.174 Under this test, if there is no treaty on 
the subject of the judgment, a judgment will be enforced if there has been an a 
[1] full and a fair trial abroad [2] before a court of 
competent jurisdiction, [3] conducting the trial upon regular 
proceedings, [4] after due citation or voluntary appearance 
of the defendant, . . . [5] under a system of jurisprudence 
likely to secure an impartial administration of justice 
between the citizens of its own country and those of other 
countries, . . . [6] nothing to show prejudice in the court, . . . 
[7][nothing to show prejudice] in the systems of laws under 
which it was sitting, . . . [8] [no] fraud in procuring the 
judgment, . . . [9] any other special reason comity . . . should 
not allow it full effect.175
Under this rationale, the Hilton case would have likely come out 
differently because it seemed to satisfy the test above, but at the time it was 
decided reciprocity was the overruling factor. This test implies that a judgment 
garnered for a foreign investor from a foreign court will be presumptively 
enforceable because the US likes to have its judgments enforced abroad. In 
addition to the option of using the Hilton test, the Uniform Foreign Money 
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Judgments Recognition Act (UFMJRA) has been adopted by 30 states, the 
District of Columbia, and the US Virgin Islands as the guide for foreign 
judgment enforcement.176 The UFMJRA, as stated in §2 of the Act, “applies to 
any foreign judgment that is final and conclusive and enforceable where 
rendered.”177 Additionally, the UFMJRA offers both mandatory and 
discretionary instances in which the foreign judgment is either not conclusive 
or “need not be recognized,” respectively.178
Therefore, if a foreign investor were able to gain a money judgment 
that it was looking to have enforced in the US, a court would have the option 
to use the Hilton test or the UFMJRA to decide whether it is enforceable, 
depending on the jurisdiction in which the court sits. As mentioned earlier in 
this section, enforcement of foreign judgments may be a quick way for 
investors to institute change in the US securities markets because if, for 
example, investment firms have to pay out judgments, whether they be large or 
small, the firms may look more closely at the risk of the investments they are 
selling if they are losing money and having to defend themselves in civil 
actions.    
A contrary assumption to that espoused above, that investors may see 
foreign judgments as a way to bring attention to the allegedly unfair or 
unrealistic ratings of US securities, may be that foreign investors do not want 
to settle these issues on a case by case basis. Instead, they may desire to have a 
set of rights created for them or an international rating system that would help 
them to invest their money better. Although that desire may be much easier to 
dream than to actually come to fruition, court fees can become very expensive, 
so foreign investors would have to weigh the costs and benefits of trying to 
change the system through foreign judgments before actually bringing suit. 
III. CONCLUSION
As globalization has rapidly made the business world flat and 
accessible to almost anyone with a computer, the creation of an international 
rating system for securities seems to be a plausible and beneficial objective. In 
the wake of the subprime mortgage collapse and constant questions about 
hedge funds, countries like France and Germany have already indicated that 
they want more international regulation.179 However, the idea of an 
international rating system is not a new one. During the late 1990’s, an Asian 
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financial crisis encouraged “President Bill Clinton and a number of regulators 
and politicians [to] push[] to remake the global financial system. But the 
impetus faded as markets stabilized.”180 In addition to trying to make the rights 
before the anger and hurt subside over the current mortgage crisis, like it did in 
the late 1990’s, creating these rights may be more easily said than done.
Sources of transnational law, including the treaties, international 
organizations, customary international law, and regulatory regimes discussed 
earlier all have benefits and costs that would have to be weighed before action 
could be taken. One of the major costs to be considered is that nations, like the 
US, who have securities regulations in place, may not be willing to give up 
sovereignty in order to make it easier for foreign investors to invest in their 
markets. If foreign investment does not change, nations like the US have no 
incentive to alter their practices, and only time will tell if foreign investors will 
pull their money out of US markets. Additionally, a desire for competition 
among markets and regulatory regimes may be an aspiration that leads State 
actors away from creating an international rating system or setting
international standards for rating securities. Lastly, trying to carve out investor 
rights by bringing judicial actions may be both time consuming and 
impractical. Thus, although foreign investors would like to see more 
regulatory rights, the consequences of the collapse of the subprime mortgage 
market will likely have to become much worse in order for change to be 
inspired.
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